Answers are grounded in this paper and cite their sources.
Residential price support can weaken incentives to invest in energy efficiency, but how increasing-block tariffs, seasonal discounts and bill-proportional surcharges jointly shape these incentives has not been formalised. This study derives the private value of a saved kilowatt-hour under these instruments and the conditions under which a seasonal discount makes an efficiency investment unprofitable, and applies them to Ecuador’s 2026 residential tariffs and a documented air-conditioner upgrade (energy-efficiency ratio 4.38 to 5.59; USD 352; 360 kWh/year) from participant, sector and resource perspectives. A discount reduces the value of saved electricity by (1 + σ)θΔp, where σ is the cross-subsidy contribution rate, θ the share of savings in the discount season and Δp the price cut. At 600 kWh/month in Guayaquil, the internal rate of return falls from 9.7% to 6.4%, the largest premium recoverable at 8% falls from USD 384 to 323, and the return stays below 8% for any θ above 0.22. This is a regulation-induced efficiency gap. The gap persists under real tariff changes, savings degradation and rebound. Against an average-cost reference, bills at 150–1000 kWh/month are already USD 69–163 per year below cost; the discount widens this gap only above 500 kWh/month. Results describe financial attractiveness, not observed purchases.
No takes yet. Share an insight, caveat, or question.
Alvarado-Arias et al. (2026) studied this question.
Synapse has enriched 10 related papers. Consider them for comparative context: