Answers are grounded in this paper and cite their sources.
Prognostic communication is commonly justified by its contribution to autonomous decision-making, treatment planning, advance care planning, and preparation for death. Yet patients vary substantially in how much prognostic information they wish to receive. This paper identifies a distinct reason for prognostic refusal: a patient may decline further temporal specification not because death is denied or the truth is intolerable, but because prognosis can reorganize the future as a bounded remainder to be managed. I call this transformation the remaining-life project. Awareness that illness is incurable or life-limiting may already narrow the temporal horizon, while numerical or otherwise localized estimates can further sharpen and stabilize that horizon. Activities, relationships, unfinished affairs, and even inactivity may then become interpretable as uses of scarce remaining time. The paper distinguishes decision-enabling information, which may be necessary for particular choices, from life-framing information, which organizes life more broadly around an anticipated endpoint. It argues that prognostic refusal can be compatible with autonomy, agency, and authenticity, and defends a limited, defeasible authority to decline non-essential temporal framing rather than an absolute right to ignorance. Because prognostic estimates are both uncertain and potentially life-organizing, the appropriate clinical response is neither routine disclosure nor silence, but permission-sensitive communication: offering prognostic discussion, clarifying preferences, providing what is necessary for present decisions, and avoiding unnecessary imposition of a temporal horizon.
No takes yet. Share an insight, caveat, or question.
Minoru Matsui (2026) studied this question.
Synapse has enriched 10 related papers. Consider them for comparative context: