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Whether the traditions of India, China, Africa, and elsewhere count as philosophy or as wisdom is a deep disagreement in Fogelin’s sense. It turns on a framework commitment about what counts as philosophy, and that commitment is seldom argued for. This paper argues that the commitment ranks a theoretical register of thought above a cultivational one. The inclusionist reply to exclusion argues across the disagreement by accepting the opponent’s framework. It shows that a tradition is argued and theorised, and in doing so it moves the tradition’s cultivational dimension outside philosophy. The paper calls this remainder the wisdom residue , and the pattern that produces it admission by conformity . A worked case from Nyāya and a reading of the Greek tradition show that the disputed line runs inside traditions rather than between them. A historical argument shows that the line’s evaluative charge reversed between the late seventeenth and early nineteenth centuries. The paper ends with a qualified optimism about deep disagreement. Rival framework criteria can be compared by how stable they remain under a change of standpoint, and by that test an answerability criterion is less parochial than the inherited one.
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Swonam Kieran Roul (2026) studied this question.
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