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This paper estimates the policy and economic impacts of a European Union-led effort to review and “blacklist” jurisdictions based on their noncompliance with international standards designed to curb corporate profit shifting and private tax evasion. Using a combination of regression discontinuity and difference-and-difference methods, I find evidence of improvements in tax governance four years after the inception of the list. However, despite evidence that some jurisdiction raised their tax rates in response to the listing exercise, there no clear evidence that listing had a significant impact on offshore wealth or shifted profits, largely because the bulk of jurisdictions that host both of these were not targeted by the EU. The results suggest that “coercive” efforts to reduce global tax evasion and avoidance will struggle without better targeting and enforcement.
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Matthew Collin (2026) studied this question.
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