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This article analyses parties’ territorial spending preferences in Spain using a dataset of budget-increase amendments proposed during parliamentary debates on 23 national budget bills. The findings reject the idea that parties use amendments to reward loyal voters. Instead, they reveal the importance of incumbency: parties governing at the regional level are significantly more likely to propose amendments benefiting provinces within their regions. This pattern appears among both statewide and regional parties, although it is driven mainly by Catalan regional parties. All regional parties also prioritize provinces within their territorial boundaries, regardless of electoral support or incumbency. Beyond these tactical elements, the results show evidence of programmatic allocation, with all parties proposing more budget increases for wealthier and more populous provinces.
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Anna M. Palau (2026) studied this question.
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