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The article aims to provide a theoretical and methodological substantiation of the public administration mechanism for balancing national security interests and citizens’ rights in the context of international armed conflict, to identify the criteria for the permissibility of state interference with rights, and to develop an institutional model for the justification, oversight, review, and termination of such interference. In contrast to approaches that regard national security and citizens’ rights as a priori competing values, this study conceptualises their balance as a continuous, institutionally and procedurally organised process for determining the permissible scope of public authority interference, in which human rights simultaneously constitute an object of security policy and a normative limit on the means by which such policy is implemented. The methodological framework combines systemic and institutional approaches; the study employs the comparative method, structural-functional analysis, content analysis, legal and regulatory analysis, secondary data analysis, descriptive statistics, scientific generalisation, synthesis, and conceptual modelling. The empirical basis comprises Ukrainian legislation and regulations, materials produced by international and national institutions, and the findings of empirical studies on mobilisation, information, digital, and territorial governance under wartime conditions. It is established that the balance between national security interests and citizens’ rights should be ensured through continuous verification of the causal link between a specific threat, the protected national interest, the measure adopted, and the intensity of its impact on the relevant right. Three fundamental principles of such balancing are substantiated: evidentiary traceability, which requires a reproducible causal link from an identified threat to a specific measure; institutional controllability, whereby the decision-making authority cannot unilaterally determine the final assessment of the lawfulness and necessity of its own decision; and temporal reversibility, which prevents a temporary restriction from acquiring a presumption of permanence merely because of the prolonged duration of an armed conflict. The regulatory, administrative-procedural, judicial, parliamentary, ombudsman, civic, and information-and-communication mechanisms for maintaining this balance are systematised as a polycentric system of complementary institutional safeguards designed to mitigate the risks of excessive security-related discretion. The analysis of mobilisation, information, digital, and centralised wartime governance revealed different types of potential imbalance: in mobilisation governance, the principal risks are individualised administrative error and the insufficient effectiveness of appeal mechanisms; in information security, excessively broad interference; in digital public administration, digital exclusion, technological dependence, and unequal access; and in wartime centralisation, the entrenchment of temporarily transferred competences and the erosion of local autonomy. It is demonstrated that the basic criteria for assessing a security-related decision should remain universal, whereas the evidentiary requirements for their application should be differentiated according to the specific characteristics of the respective governance domain. An original balance assessment matrix is developed, comprising ten interrelated criteria: legality, legitimacy of purpose, necessity, proportionality, temporariness, controllability, appealability, accountability, reviewability, and restorability of the right. The concept of «resilience of the balance between national security interests and citizens’ rights» is proposed to describe the capacity of the public administration system, under the prolonged impact of a security threat, to preserve the normative link between the nature of the threat and the permissible intensity of interference, maintain effective mechanisms of independent oversight and review, prevent the institutionalisation of temporary restrictions, and ensure an actual return to the ordinary regime for the exercise of rights. The principal outcome of the study is an original model of the institutional cycle of balancing security and rights, encompassing the identification of a security threat and the relevant national interest, determination of the right concerned and the scope of potential interference, assessment of necessity, identification of a less restrictive alternative, proportionality assessment, adoption of a competent and reasoned decision, institutional oversight, periodic reassessment of necessity, adjustment or termination of the measure, restoration of the ordinary regime for the exercise of the right, and institutional learning. The principle of asymmetry of justification is substantiated, according to which the introduction and each subsequent extension of a restriction require affirmative evidentiary justification by public authorities, whereas, once the security necessity has ceased to exist, the restoration of the full scope of the right should not depend on any additional justification by the citizen. The practical value of the findings lies in the possibility of applying the proposed matrix and institutional cycle to the ex ante assessment of draft regulatory and administrative decisions, institutional audits of existing security measures, identification of risks associated with their unjustified continuation, and the inventory of temporary restrictions, special competences, and procedures during the transition from emergency to ordinary public administration.
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Акімов et al. (2026) studied this question.
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