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What does the resort to irregular forces, alongside regular armies, say about the modern state at war? And what does such a resort do to the state itself? These are the central questions this paper addresses. In so doing, it zooms in on contemporary wars in the Middle East. It highlights that the long-term process of military bureaucratization is neither linear nor unidimensional. Wars redraw the borders between military regularity and irregularity in ways that durably shape political institutions. Military irregularity can, however, take many forms and produce widely different effects depending on institutional context. A partial cooptation or integration of ‘irregular forces’ into a state's security apparatus can increase a government's infrastructural power and ability to reshape political institutions; insofar as the bureaucratic backbone of its regular army is not undermined in the process. Should the governing elite, however, fully rely on irregular forces, for example to circumvent the inherent restrictions of regular military bureaucracies, this might not only undermine military bureaucracy, but also compromise any capacity to govern.
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Christian Olsson (2026) studied this question.
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