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Relevance. The effectiveness of public administration in the sphere of security is determined not only by the resource capacity of individual security and defence sector actors, but primarily by the quality of their horizontal interaction under dynamic hybrid threats. The experience of repelling massed missile and drone strikes on Ukraine’s critical infrastructure in 2022–2024 has shown that departmental data fragmentation, functional duplication, and the absence of formalized interaction protocols among the intelligence community, civil protection forces, and critical infrastructure operators significantly reduce the speed and quality of administrative decisions. Aim. The article aims to diagnose the key problems of interagency coordination in the sphere of state security of Ukraine and to substantiate organizational mechanisms for solving them. Objectives: to identify typical determinants of interagency interaction inefficiency; to demonstrate, using the "detection – alerting – response" chain during massed strikes on energy infrastructure, how data fragmentation translates into a loss of response time; to develop the authors’ previously proposed resilience mechanisms into operational proposals; to assess the potential of existing digital situational-awareness platforms for expanding coordination beyond the military domain. Methods. Systemic and comparative analysis of foreign coordination models, case study, structural-logical modelling. Results. Five systemic determinants of coordination inefficiency were identified: hierarchy instead of networking; departmental data fragmentation; unformalized interaction protocols; legal gaps in the distribution of powers; and the absence of an institutionalized lessons-learned cycle. The case study demonstrated a gap between military intelligence information and civilian response. An organizational-legal mechanism for overcoming this gap is substantiated, based on extending the architecture of an existing situational-awareness platform to non-military coordination actors. Conclusions. Eliminating interagency fragmentation requires a shift from a hierarchical to a network-centric security governance model, the institutionalization of subsidiarity-based response protocols, and a legally embedded lessons-learned cycle.
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Rohovets et al. (2026) studied this question.
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