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This article examines how trade in intermediate goods between China, connector economies and the United States changed around the “Liberation Day” tariffs of 2 April 2025 compared with the 2018 Section 301 tariffs. Using an annual panel of 2538 HS6 lines classified as intermediate goods for 22 connector economies (2006–2025), we compare 11 hubs whose exports to the U.S. tracked their imports from China after 2018 with a two-country comparison group using difference-in-differences and event study specifications. In 2025, hub exports of intermediates to the U.S. rose by about 0.27 log points more compared to the comparison group; the estimate is stable across alternative classifications (0.22–0.30) and comparison groups (0.21–0.32), but, with two comparison hubs, its significance depends on the inference procedure. Imports from China show no robust differential change, and their pre-shock trends differ, so the import side is not interpreted causally. We find no significant hub-level anticipation in 2024, no established difference from the 2018 response and no differences across tariff tiers. Monthly HS6 data for the China–Vietnam–U.S. corridor show Vietnam’s gains coinciding with decreasing direct imports from China in the same lines, concentrated in lines with low U.S. duties on China and in lines whose trade pattern is consistent with the assembly of Chinese inputs, with about half the lines adjusting before the 2025 shock; these results are not extended to other hubs. Because hub status cannot be reconstructed from pre-2018 characteristics, we interpret proxy hubs as a structure formed in response to the 2018 shock, which the 2025 shock met already in place. The analysis concerns trade flows, not GDP, prices or welfare.
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Козюк et al. (2026) studied this question.
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