Answers are grounded in this paper and cite their sources.
Purpose This study aims to examine the impact of shadow banking regulation on corporate tax avoidance and the underlying mechanisms driving this effect. Design/methodology/approach Drawing on a firm-level sample of Chinese A-share listed companies covering the period 2010–2024, this paper uses China’s 2017 shadow banking regulations as a quasi-natural experiment and adopts a difference-in-differences framework to identify the causal effect of shadow banking regulation on corporate tax avoidance. The authors further explore the underlying transmission mechanisms and cross-sectional heterogeneity of this relationship. Findings Shadow banking regulation significantly reduces corporate tax avoidance. Improvements in corporate information transparency and stronger governance constraints are two important channels through which this effect operates. Further analysis shows that the negative effect of shadow banking regulation on tax avoidance is more pronounced among firms with greater tax-avoidance opportunities, tighter financing constraints, weaker internal governance, weaker regional legal institutions and lower product-market competition. Originality/value This study contributes to the literature on the economic consequences of shadow banking regulation and the determinants of corporate tax avoidance. It provides new evidence that financial regulation can shape corporate tax behavior by improving the transparency of financing arrangements and strengthening governance. The findings show that the effects of shadow banking regulation extend beyond financing and resource allocation.
No takes yet. Share an insight, caveat, or question.
Zhou et al. (2026) studied this question.
Synapse has enriched 10 related papers. Consider them for comparative context: