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Security operations teams in IoT-rich and distributed enterprise environments are routinely faced with backlogs of tens of thousands of disclosed vulnerabilities, yet must focus remediation efforts on the small fraction that carries real exploitation risk. Sharing the threat intelligence needed to make that judgment accurately is often legally or contractually impossible because raw vulnerability records expose sensitive asset and configuration data. We address this tension with the Federated Vulnerability Prioritization and Management (FVPM) framework, which lets multiple organizations collaboratively train a shared risk model while each retains its local CVE data behind its own perimeter. Our dataset covers 220,763 CVE records from the National Vulnerability Database (NVD), enriched with EPSS exploitability scores. Rather than using CVSS severity thresholds as a proxy for risk, we build ground-truth high-risk labels from confirmed exploitation evidence in three independent sources—the CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) catalog, ExploitDB, and the Metasploit Framework—yielding 4528 HighRisk CVEs (2.05% of the dataset). Training uses a three-layer MLP (128 → 64 → 32 neurons) distributed across 20 non-IID federated clients; Focal Loss combined with SMOTE handles the severe class imbalance, and Platt calibration corrects the probability overestimation that SMOTE introduces before scores feed into the composite prioritization formula. Under the non-IID partition, FedAvg reaches PR-AUC = 0.4428 and ROC-AUC = 0.8880, against a centralized baseline PR-AUC of 0.6005. The resulting federated performance gap of ΔPR-AUC ≈ 0.16 reflects the cost of training without data sharing, not a formal privacy mechanism, and we argue it is an acceptable trade-off given that raw organizational records never leave local systems. Weight optimization over the FVPM composite score selects WEPSS=1.00 as the highest-accuracy configuration; SHAP attribution independently confirms EPSS as the dominant predictive feature (Mean|SHAP| = 3.69), with VulnerabilityAge and AttackVector as secondary signals. FVPM nevertheless adds value beyond standalone EPSS: it provides early-warning estimates for newly disclosed CVEs before EPSS scores are published, supports privacy-preserving inference over local asset inventories, and allows organizations to customize composite weights to their own criticality profiles.
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Alsirhani et al. (2026) studied this question.
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