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Preprint submitted on 17 November 2026 to the Journal of Law, Society, and Authority (University of Oran 2), Special Issue "The Normalisation of the Populist Radical Right in Europe: Political, Legal and Institutional Transformations" (February 2027). This version has not been peer reviewed. The literature on the normalisation of the populist radical right in Europe describes with great precision how parties once kept behind a cordon sanitaire have entered coalitions, how their positions have been adopted by the mainstream and how their language has become ordinary. It explains less well why the process occurs almost everywhere and almost simultaneously. This article argues that populism is best understood not as an ideology but as a strategy of power: the equilibrium strategy of an excluded actor facing a centrist government when ordinary alternation in office is closed. The strategy consists in turning the position inside or outside power into the principal axis of political choice. Its left or right sign is set by the content of the consensus removed from electoral contestation, which is why it moves as a pendulum; its intensity is set by the degree of closure and by external resonance. The article reconstructs the mechanism step by step: the change of dimension, the truel against the centre, the reciprocal externality of disorder by which each flank gains more from its opponent's disorder than from its own, the agenda multiplier, contagion without a central coordinator, and the three outcomes of victory (transformation, failure or capture). A comparative table of thirteen cases of populist radical right parties in office shows that ordinary participation in government was followed in nearly every case by electoral loss, that gains in office occurred only under legal capture, and that capture was reversed when the incumbent's vote deficit exceeded the tilt of the field (Poland 2023, Hungary 2026). The article replaces the label of fascism with a process of fascistisation identified by an observable marker, and proposes a Citizen Exposure Index with mirrored probes. It adds a third channel of normalisation to parties and ideas: the normalisation of legal instruments, which pass from one government to the next. It offers a test distinguishing populism from radical but workable reform, treats law as mechanism design, and formulates a criterion for instruments that can safely survive their makers, together with an inverted latency principle: in a resilient democracy help to the individual must be fast and power over the individual slow. Keywords:populism; normalisation; populist radical right; militant democracy; democratic resilience; constitutional design; mechanism design; game theory; fascistisation; cordon sanitaire; autocratic legalism; European Union; universal basic income; transaction tax Language: English License: Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International (CC BY 4.0) Related works: References — 10.5281/zenodo.18706752 (Kriger, B., AUTT and Request-Based UBI) References — 10.13140/RG.2.2.26532.64648 (Kriger, B., The Retrospective Drift Theorem) References — 10.5281/zenodo.21568121 (Kriger, P., Latency Collapse) References — 10.1257/aer.20202045 (Funke, Schularick, Trebesch 2023) Additional notes: Submitted manuscript (preprint) deposited in accordance with the repository policy of the Journal of Law, Society, and Authority, which permits deposit of the submitted version. If accepted, the published version will be linked here.
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Boris Kriger (2026) studied this question.
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