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This article studies the procedural dynamics of military decision-making during nonviolent mass uprisings that threaten an authoritarian regime’s survival known as “dictator’s endgame.” Existing theories explain initial loyalty to the incumbent and military defection but do not adequately explain when, how, and why a military reassesses its decision in an endgame. We argue that the outcome of the second decision — whether to remain loyal or to switch allegiance — reflects changes in the relative payoffs of loyalty and defection as protest dynamics evolve and the effectiveness of repression becomes clearer. We trace military decision-making during escalating protest repression and shifting legitimacy in two cases. We compare Myanmar’s 2021 anti-coup protests, during which military repression continued, with Bangladesh’s 2024 uprising against Sheikh Hasina, during which initial repression gave way to a loyalty shift.
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Wießmann et al. (2026) studied this question.
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