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This study examines the differing strategies for constituting the “Other” in the works of Husserl and Scheler, based on their contrasting ontological views of reality. First, we reconstruct Husserl’s early ideas on the “Other” within the framework of transcendental idealism, emphasising the foundational aspects of his theory of intentionality. Second, we explore Scheler’s dualistic ontology of “spirit” and “drive” and his concept of Sympathie to address the constitution of the “Other”. Unlike Husserl’s static view of intentional consciousness, Scheler introduces a dynamic understanding, viewing the affective faculties as evolving in their relation to the “Other”. Scheler’s theory extends beyond Husserl’s transcendental analysis by offering a clearer distinction between Sosein and Dasein and by introducing the concept of the “person” and its action as foundational for knowing the “Other” in its full ontological depth. This article highlights how Scheler’s approach opens up new possibilities for understanding intersubjectivity and alterity in a more dynamic, relational framework than Husserl’s transcendental model.
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Zhang et al. (2026) studied this question.
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