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South Korea’s December 2024 martial law crisis raises a puzzle: how can substantial democratic resilience coexist with vulnerability to renewed destabilisation? Drawing on Rawls, Habermas, and Arendt, this article develops a normative account of the relationship between privacy, autonomy, and public reason. It brings that account into dialogue with published research on Korean politics, using selected presidential remarks as illustrations. The argument distinguishes the epistemic promise of collective intelligence from the reciprocal justification required for democratic legitimacy. A thin appeal to successful crisis mobilisation cannot, by itself, explain how independent judgements enter ordinary institutional practices of reason-giving. The article connects this problem to the reduction of the ‘private’ (sajŏgin kŏt) to self-regarding interest, which can obscure privacy’s role in protecting independent judgement. The claim is not that Korean citizens lack autonomy or democratic culture. Rather, the proposed ‘autonomy deficit’ concerns the relationship between the political meaning of the private and the institutions through which citizens can form, challenge, and justify political judgements. This framework clarifies why successful resistance to authoritarian overreach does not settle the distinct normative demands of democratic consolidation.
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Jun et al. (2026) studied this question.
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