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In response to anthropomorphizing claims in research on generative artificial intelligence in language education, this paper explores agency largely through a conceptual discussion of the distinct and emergent properties and powers of both humans and generative artificial intelligence, and how understanding of these properties and powers might illuminate certain aspects of their interaction. The paper begins by acknowledging that the ascription of agency to generative artificial intelligence has both ontological and epistemological dimensions, leading to an account of the author’s reflexive stance towards the agency issue. Ontological points of convergence and divergence between generative artificial intelligence and language learners and teachers are then explored, leading to consideration of different types of agency, and how conceptualizations of these types help or hinder our understanding of agency. The paper distinguishes between volitional agency, affordances and non-volitional causal powers, and provides a realist critique of the tendency among scholars to adopt flat ontologies to define generative artificial intelligence as an agent.
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Jérémie Bouchard (2026) studied this question.
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