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Background: Performance-based payment is now widely used to improve efficiency and accountability in healthcare systems. In Iran, this model was introduced under the Health Transformation Plan with the aim of enhancing hospital performance and staff motivation; however, emerging evidence points to notable challenges in its implementation. While previous research has largely examined providers' responses, far less attention has been paid to how hospital managers—those directly responsible for implementing these policies—interpret and manage these incentives in practice. This study explores managers' perspectives on how performance-based payment operates in practice and where they perceive its primary shortcomings. Objective: To explore how public hospital managers interpret, implement, and critically assess performance-based payment, with a particular focus on its operational challenges and unintended consequences. Materials and methods: This qualitative study employed a conventional content analysis approach. Semi-structured interviews were conducted with 11 public hospital managers selected through purposive sampling with maximum variation. Data collection continued until thematic saturation was achieved. Analysis followed an iterative process involving open coding, category development, and abstraction of themes. Trustworthiness was ensured using Lincoln and Guba's criteria. Results: Four main themes emerged: imbalance in motivational drivers, threats to organizational commitment, quality–quantity trade-offs, and structural inefficiencies. Although participants acknowledged the system's potential to differentiate performance and support cost control, they consistently highlighted delayed payments—often extending to 6–8 months—alongside limited transparency in calculation mechanisms and perceived inequities in distribution. These challenges were described as weakening the intended motivational effects of the system and were, in some cases, associated with reduced organizational attachment, increased emphasis on service volume over quality, and tendencies toward dual practice. Conclusion: The effectiveness of performance-based payment in public hospitals appears to be shaped less by its formal design than by the conditions under which it is implemented. Delayed payments, constrained managerial discretion, and limited transparency emerged as key factors undermining its intended impact. Addressing these requires more timely and transparent payment processes alongside greater organizational flexibility— findings that carry implications for other health systems confronting analogous reform challenges.
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Zeynali et al. (2026) studied this question.
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