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Mandatory audit firm rotation was introduced in the European Union (EU), in part, to make the audit market more dynamic by bringing audit engagements to market more frequently. However, it creates a countervailing economic force: By limiting the duration of auditor–client relationships, mandatory rotation shortens the period over which auditors can recoup first‐year fee discounts through fees earned in subsequent years. Consistent with this argument, we find that first‐year fee discounts decline substantially after mandatory firm rotation took effect in the EU, particularly in countries with stricter limits on auditor tenure. Thus, greater opportunities to compete for new engagements do not necessarily translate into greater first‐year fee discounts. Our findings highlight that regulators should consider not only how frequently audit engagements are brought to market but also how limits on auditor tenure shape the pricing incentives associated with competing for new clients.
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Sufaj et al. (2026) studied this question.
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