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China’s Ten-Dash Line claim, which Indonesia does not recognize, intrudes into Indonesia’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) in the North Natuna Sea and continues to undermine relations between the two states. Existing studies interpret Indonesia’s handling of these tensions through the prisms of deference and defiance, consistent with the hedging literature. However, these interpretations produce negative labels, with scholars describing its South China Sea policies as incoherent, dysfunctional, suboptimal, and ambivalent. This study takes a different approach, framing these policies as consistent with resilience-building measures and therefore deliberately constructed. Informed by the discourse analysis method of second-generation securitization scholars and bridging the ‘de-risking’ framework from the finance literature, this study argues that, in the face of risks in the South China Sea, Indonesian policymaking elites stage risks in the present to address future possibilities of harm. Examining Indonesia’s security concerns in the South China Sea between 2014 and 2024 reveals several de-risking policies undertaken by Indonesian officials to anticipate the unknowable future: limited-coercive symbolic gestures, the public sinking of illegal ships, reform of the maritime governance structure, development of Indonesia’s outermost, underdeveloped, and frontier regions, fulfillment of Indonesia’s minimum essential forces in maritime security dimensions, and the engagement of defensive diplomacy.
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Bama Andika Putra (2026) studied this question.
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