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Countries worldwide use earmarks and minimum spending rules to protect public health financing, yet little is known about what happens when authority over the allocation of protected funds shifts to actors outside the health sector. Brazil's 2015 health financing reform offers a revealing case. After years of health-sector mobilization for stronger federal funding of the universal health system (SUS), Brazil adopted a constitutional amendment (EC 86) that sought to protect federal health funding by tying it to a share of federal revenues. Contrary to advocates' demands, however, the same reform shifted authority over the allocation of a growing share of federal health resources from the Ministry of Health to members of Congress, a template expanded by later reforms. This study explains how a sectoral demand for increased funding produced a reform that redistributed budget authority and disrupted the governance of health financing. Applying Campos & Reich's political analysis framework, with a focus on budget politics, it draws on 23 interviews (2025-2026) and documentary sources (2010-2016). A public health movement backed by 1.8 million citizen signatures placed federal underfunding on the agenda but failed to shape the reform's design. By 2025, following reforms that expanded the EC 86 template, legislators allocated 44.3% of the Ministry of Health's discretionary budget through transfers weakly linked to planning and need-based criteria, fragmenting and destabilizing SUS financing. The case shows how demands for increased health funding can be absorbed into broader budgetary disputes and reshaped to protect spending levels while undermining health financing governance.
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Alexandre Handfas (2026) studied this question.
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