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Encrypted blockchain mempools mitigate Maximal Extractable Value (MEV) by concealing transaction contents until ordering is committed. However, attackers can exploit deferred validation to consume network resources with encrypted transactions that deterministically fail after decryption, creating a Denial-of-Service (DoS) threat. In this paper, we propose EATGuard, a DoS-resistant encrypted mempool protocol that combines privacy-preserving admission with stage-aware accountability. The core innovation is the Enhanced Admission Ticket (EAT), which proves hidden admission predicates and binds each ciphertext to a slashable sender bond with an epoch quota. This binding enables block builders to reject inadmissible or over-quota traffic before decryption and preserves evidence for sender slashing when deterministic faults are exposed afterward. Moreover, a unified smart contract enforces stage-aware accountability by penalizing block builders for admission faults and senders for static transaction faults, while leaving state-dependent failures non-punitive. Experimental results demonstrate that EATGuard provides fault accountability with moderate overhead while sustaining honest transaction processing under mixed DoS traffic through early filtering.
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Wu et al. (2026) studied this question.
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