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In this paper, I consider the complex relationship between retributive punishment and revenge. I respond to an abolitionist challenge that claims that retributive punishment is morally problematic because of its psychological and conceptual proximity to the practice of revenge. I challenge the abolitionist conclusion on two integrated fronts. First, I argue that the distinctions between retribution and revenge—concerning their triggers, proportionality, generality, emotional tone, and communicative purpose—are not descriptive sociological facts but are normative ideal-types. They articulate a spectrum of retaliatory action, from raw personal vengeance to principled public justice. Second, I criticise the premise that revenge is invariably immoral. Through examining the psychological, social, and philosophical aspects of revenge, I argue that the impulse to retaliate embodies a legitimate moral claim to justice and is not merely a destructive urge. The moral status of any retaliatory action increases when it aligns with the principles of ideal retribution. I differentiate between the legal validity of punishment and its moral justification: while state punishment may be legally valid, it can still be morally unjust. In this way, ideal retribution should be seen as a regulative standard to evaluate such punishment, not as a description of any existing penal system. I acknowledge the connection between retribution and this psychological drive, and defend retribution as an institutional mechanism that preserves and channels this demand for justice. It helps eliminate the biases and excesses often involved in private vengeance to make the process safer and more principled.
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Shervin MirzaeiGhazi (2026) studied this question.
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