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The standard theory of Central Bank Independence (CBI) establishes that a discretionary policymaker might maximize social welfare but exploit the short‐run trade‐off between inflation and output. Building upon this, we investigate the impact of CBI on green loans using an unbalanced panel of 13,150 observations from financial firms across a global sample over 15 years (2010–2024). We find that financial firms issue fewer green loans in the short‐term with the increase of CBI. We further show that this constraining effect intensifies when interest rates are high, consistent with a borrowing‐cost channel linking CBI to green lending. We also document that the Paris Agreement offsets the negative effect of CBI on green lending in countries that underwent central bank reforms during this period, consistent with the Agreement functioning as a policy signal that tempers central bank neutrality in some contexts. Our findings suggest that the temporal negative impact of CBI on green loans is more pronounced for financial firms with larger size, lower loan growth, greater noninterest income, nonadoption of GRI, lower ESG performance and those who are nonsignatories of the Equator Principles. For financial firms operating in countries with lower capital requirements, regulatory quality and control of corruption, we observe that increases in CBI are associated with temporal reductions of green loans. The results are consistent with robust proxies for CBI and green loans and after accounting for endogeneity issues.
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Hasan et al. (2026) studied this question.
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