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This article uses the career of Agha Petros Elia d’Baz between 1920 and 1932 to examine a structural problem of British imperial governance: how officials managed political actors who claimed to speak for colonised populations but held no formally recognised representative authority. Drawing on Colonial Office, India Office and Foreign Office records, Ottoman and Turkish documents and the press, it follows Petros from the disintegration of the British-backed repatriation force he commanded in 1920, through Lausanne, London and the Mosul Boundary Commission, to Geneva. It argues that British distrust originated in that concrete operational failure, but hardened into lasting exclusion because his mode of representation was illegible to a bureaucracy that privileged documentary proof, recognised authority and manageable intermediaries. Legibility cut both ways: Petros read each diplomatic moment shrewdly, and his claims carried weight while the protection of Christian ‘small nationalities’ shaped Allied posturing, losing it once the Turkish state reasserted itself at Lausanne. His grievance was finally neither conceded nor refuted but closed, through a £375 ex gratia payment and a binding waiver. Imperial governance here operated through bureaucratic closure, a technique for disposing of intermediaries whose usefulness had lapsed but whose capacity for embarrassment had not.
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ÜNİŞEN et al. (2026) studied this question.
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