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The principle of majority rule is fundamental to the efficient operation of companies, yet it creates a structural risk that those who control voting power will advance their own interests at the expense of minority shareholders. This systematic literature review examines the legal doctrines, statutory remedies and practical challenges that define the protection of minority shareholders under majority rule. Following the PRISMA 2020 guidelines, a structured multi-database search of Scopus, Web of Science, HeinOnline, JSTOR, SSRN and related sources identified 1,248 unique records. After title and abstract screening and full-text eligibility assessment, 68 high-quality studies were retained for thematic synthesis. The review traces the evolution of the rule in Foss v Harbottle (1843) and its exceptions, analyses the modern unfair-prejudice and oppression remedies under the UK Companies Act 2006 and equivalent Commonwealth statutes, and evaluates derivative actions, buy-out orders and majority-of-minority voting mechanisms. Critical analysis demonstrates that formal legal protections frequently outstrip their practical enforceability, particularly in concentrated-ownership systems and family-controlled companies. Significant gaps remain in the empirical evaluation of remedy effectiveness in African and other emerging jurisdictions, the regulation of dual-class share structures, and the interaction between statutory rights and private ordering through shareholders' agreements. The paper concludes by proposing a focused research agenda for future scholarship and policy reform.
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Wamboga James (2026) studied this question.
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