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This article examines GCC states’ expanding engagement with Asia-oriented institutions between 2015 and 2026 alongside their continued participation in US-anchored and cross-regional frameworks. Focusing on Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Qatar, and using structured comparison and process tracing, it argues that this seemingly contradictory pattern reflects institutional hedging rather than strategic realignment towards China. GCC hedging is therefore multi-directional: Gulf states assemble differentiated institutional portfolios to advance state-building, economic diversification, connectivity, and diplomatic autonomy while preserving US-centred hard-security ties. US pressure is strongest in sensitive technology and security sectors, prompting sectoral separation, selective compliance, low-commitment participation, and calculated ambiguity. The 2026 Israel-US-Iran war reaffirmed American security centrality but did not end Gulf institutional hedging; instead, it made the strategy more selective and asymmetrical.
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Gafar Karar Ahmed (2026) studied this question.
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