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When a mass uprising topples a government yet leaves the constitutional text intact, what legal order results? Reworking an earlier South Asian judicial usage, this article reconceptualises ‘constitutional deviation’ as a black-grey hybrid condition in which public power lacks valid foundational authorisation yet operates through constitutional forms. Using post-August 2024 Bangladesh, it argues that the 1972 Grundnorm survived and the interim regime achieved neither a Kelsenian legal revolution nor democratic refounding. It diagnoses three structural failures: the efficacy fallacy conflating de facto control with de jure validity; a democratic-revolution deficit shaped by elite co-optation without representative ratification; and judicial reliance on necessity that supplied a form of grey-hole legality to foundational black-hole illegality. It then argues that the February 2026 election and Parliament’s selective treatment of interim ordinances illustrate ‘condonation without legitimation’: restoring constitutional government without retrospectively validating extra-constitutional origins. The article distinguishes constitutional deviation from emergency constitutionalism, the Schmittian exception, and completed legal revolution, offering it as an analytical framework for post-rupture transitions.
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Chowdhury et al. (2026) studied this question.
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