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Type of the article: Research ArticleAbstractPost-crisis banking reforms assume that formal risk-governance structures – board risk committees and expert directors – contain credit risk. This study examines whether risk committee size and board financial expertise are associated with credit risk in Indonesian commercial banks over 2020–2024. Using a hand-collected panel of 100 banks (500 bank-year observations) built exclusively from publicly disclosed annual reports and Basel III Pillar 3 disclosures, we regress the non-performing financing (NPF) ratio on one-period lagged governance variables. Because a Mundlak test rejects the orthogonality assumption underlying random effects (χ2(5) = 11.60, p = 0.041), inference rests on fixed-effects and correlated random-effects estimators, with random effects retained only as a comparator. Risk committee size is not associated with NPF in any specification (fixed effects: β = 0.0023, p = 0.22). Board financial expertise carries a positive, not the hypothesized negative, coefficient that never reaches the five per cent level within banks (fixed effects: β = 0.050, p = 0.066; log specification: β = 1.034, p = 0.082) and is insignificant once lagged NPF, conventional-only, no-foreign-branch, or high-CAR-exclusion specifications are considered. A formal interaction test does not establish a distinct Islamic-bank pattern (wild cluster bootstrap p = 0.31), and lead–lag tests detect no directional relationship. The study therefore finds no statistically robust within-bank association between annual changes in the two observable governance proxies and realized credit risk, while bank-level means of the regressors matter jointly, cautioning against reading cross-bank correlations as within-bank effects.
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Idroes et al. (2026) studied this question.
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