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Environmental penalties are commonly viewed as adverse regulatory signals that restrict firms’ access to external finance. However, penalty events may also generate environmental rectification needs and prompt banks to reassess firms’ post-penalty operating prospects. Using a sample of Chinese A-share non-financial listed firms from 2013 to 2023, this study merges data on corporate environmental administrative penalties with commercial bank loan data to examine whether environmental penalties induce structural adjustments in bank loan contract terms and to explore their sustainable economic consequences. The results show that environmental penalties are followed by larger amounts and longer maturities of newly obtained bank loans. These changes represent realized loan contract outcomes jointly determined by firms’ post-penalty financing needs and banks’ lending decisions. Larger and longer-term borrowing does not necessarily indicate more favorable credit conditions, as environmental penalties may increase firms’ funding requirements for rectification, liquidity management, and refinancing. The heterogeneity analysis further indicates that these effects vary with the strength of bank-firm relationships, loan risk, executives’ environmental background, and firms’ sustainability capacity. Further analysis reveals that environmental penalties, to some extent, promote subsequent corporate green investment and reduce pollutant emissions, but also intensify corporate greenwashing. By focusing on the structure of credit contracts, this study uncovers the financing contractual effects of environmental penalties and provides new firm-level evidence on how firms and banks adjust financing arrangements following environmental regulatory sanctions.
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Zhao et al. (2026) studied this question.
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