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The transition from conversational artificial intelligence to autonomous and semi-autonomous AI systems introduces fundamental challenges concerning reliability, operational control, security, and accountability. Contemporary AI agents can retrieve information, execute code, interact with external application programming interfaces, manipulate structured data, coordinate specialized agents, and perform multistep operations with varying degrees of independence. However, increasing functional capabilities also expand the range of potential failure modes, including incorrect reasoning, unauthorized tool execution, prompt injection, cascading errors, data corruption, information leakage, uncontrolled resource consumption, and failures of human oversight. This paper introduces Reliable AI Systems Design (RASD), a conceptual and engineering framework for developing AI systems whose behavior remains observable, constrained, verifiable, and recoverable under anticipated operational disturbances and adversarial conditions. The proposed framework integrates nine architectural dimensions: reliability specification, threat modeling, trust-boundary enforcement, controlled tool execution, output verification, human oversight, failure containment, recovery orchestration, and continuous evaluation. Particular attention is devoted to the security implications of agentic workflows in which large language models interact with external tools, retrieved documents, persistent memory, and other agents. The paper distinguishes probabilistic model behavior from deterministic execution controls and argues that critical security and authorization guarantees should be enforced by application infrastructure rather than entrusted exclusively to natural-language instructions. A structured failure taxonomy, a reference architecture, a risk-control matrix, operational metrics, and a validation protocol are presented. These components provide a foundation for designing systems with explicitly defined failure scenarios, control mechanisms, escalation procedures, and recovery strategies. The central proposition is that reliable AI engineering should be understood not as the elimination of all possible model errors, but as the systematic prevention of unacceptable consequences, detection of operational deviations, and controlled recovery from failures. The expected practical outcome is an AI system supported by an explicit reliability specification, enforceable control boundaries, tested failure scenarios, and a documented operational recovery procedure.
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Roman Shaban (2026) studied this question.
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