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On 20 February 2026, the Supreme Court held in Learning Resources, Inc. v. Trump that the International Emergency Economic Powers Act confers no power to impose tariffs, voiding the “reciprocal” and drug-trafficking duties levied against China, Canada, Mexico and dozens of other trading partners. This article reads the decision against a multilateral order that could not discipline those same measures: with the Appellate Body inquorate and the United States free to appeal adverse reports into the void, duties widely regarded as inconsistent with Articles I and II of the GATT escaped scrutiny in Geneva yet fell in Washington, struck down not for any breach of WTO law but on the domestic statutory ground that IEEPA, read against the Constitution’s allocation of the taxing power to Congress, conferred no tariff authority. The separation of powers review thus functioned as a substitute for the absent international check, a substitution that is partial, contingent and indifferent to multilateral legality. Because the judgment leaves untouched Sections 122, 232 and 301, the substitute offers reformers only a design template, not a durable discipline, and offers other members a check they can neither invoke nor rely upon. The episode shows what follows when a domestic constitution, not the institution designed for the task, supplies the binding limit on unilateral protectionism. The trading system, in short, gains episodic reprieves from domestic constitutionalism, but not durable discipline.
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Salmi et al. (2026) studied this question.
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