Answers are grounded in this paper and cite their sources.
This article advances a constitutional theory of the judicial role in the accommodation of national pluralism—that is, a theory of how courts should respond to conflicts concerning minority nations, focusing on Quebec, Scotland, and Catalonia. It begins by proposing an account of plurinational federalism, understood as the application of the federal principle for the purpose of accommodating minority nations. The article then derives its implications for the judicial role. Ultimately, it argues that, when adjudicating territorial conflicts, courts should take national pluralism seriously to preserve and promote the ongoing legitimacy of the constitutional order. While both courts and political actors have a role to play in accommodating national pluralism, the judicial role becomes particularly important when political accommodation fails, especially in the context of rigid constitutions. These claims are tested through a comparative analysis of case law in Canada, the United Kingdom, and Spain, focusing on judicial responses to secessionist conflicts in Quebec, Scotland, and Catalonia. The comparison highlights the strengths of the approach adopted in the Quebec Secession Reference and shows why the failure of courts to adopt a similar approach proved more problematic in Spain, with its rigid Constitution, than in the United Kingdom, where the constitution is flexible.
No takes yet. Share an insight, caveat, or question.
Josep M. Tirapu-Sanuy (2026) studied this question.
Synapse has enriched 10 related papers. Consider them for comparative context: