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Political settlements are often maintained by what actors decline to say. That silence can sustain political arrangements is well established in accounts of gag rules, incompletely theorised agreements and policy paradigms, but these treat avoidance chiefly as a feature of design or doctrine, and largely statically. Instead, this article analyses silence as an ongoing practice through which political actors keep their relationship to contested settlements governable. It distinguishes forms of silence along two dimensions: the source of the threat that articulation would activate, whether internal to a coalition (coalition-preserving silence) or external to it (risk-reducing silence); and the temporal mode in which silence is sustained, holding or transitional. It argues that silence accrues costs over time, notably the loss of deployable vocabulary, and that it ends where an occasion that compels or licenses articulation, an actor with authority to speak and a usable vocabulary coincide. The argument is developed through two episodes involving centre-left parties in Westminster systems. In British Labour’s relationship with European integration, coalition-preserving silence was broken by a referendum Labour did not choose and by a leader with authority to speak for the party but not to settle the question. In Australian housing taxation, risk-reducing silence allowed Labor to govern within a tax settlement it had opposed until the Treasurer used an oil shock in 2026 as a warrant for reform, which returned in a reconstructed frame. Silence operates as the same practice in constitutional and ordinary settlements; what differs is the structure of occasions that end it.
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John S. F. Wright (2026) studied this question.
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