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Prompt engineering is commonly conceptualized as the systematic design and refinement of instructions that guide the behavior of large language models (LLMs). However, the effectiveness and reliability of prompting depend not only on linguistic structure and technical characteristics but also on the cognitive processes of the humans who formulate, interpret, and evaluate prompts. Human reasoning is influenced by cognitive biases, including confirmation bias, anchoring, framing effects, availability bias, overconfidence, and automation bias. These mechanisms can shape the assumptions embedded in prompts, the selection of information presented to artificial intelligence, the interpretation of generated responses, and subsequent decisions about accepting or modifying outputs. This article proposes a psychologically informed conceptual framework for understanding cognitive biases throughout the prompt engineering process. It distinguishes biases originating in human cognition from prompt-induced response effects and systematic characteristics of language-model behavior. Particular attention is given to reciprocal human–AI feedback loops in which initial expectations influence prompt construction, model responses reinforce those expectations, and repeated interactions may increase perceived confidence without corresponding improvements in evidential accuracy. Building upon research in cognitive psychology, human–automation interaction, and prompt sensitivity, the article introduces Bias-Aware Prompt Engineering (BAPE) as a proposed framework for reducing epistemically undesirable bias through explicit assumption identification, alternative hypothesis generation, controlled prompt variation, independent verification, and metacognitive monitoring. Practical examples, operational indicators, and testable research hypotheses are presented. The central argument is that effective prompt engineering should be evaluated not merely by the coherence, usefulness, or persuasiveness of generated responses, but by the extent to which the interaction supports accurate reasoning, epistemic calibration, intellectual autonomy, and accountable human judgment
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Roman Shaban (2026) studied this question.
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