Answers are grounded in this paper and cite their sources.
The major theories of consciousness — Integrated Information Theory, Global WorkspaceTheory, the Free Energy Principle, and Higher-Order Thought theory — describe how con-scious systems are organised but not why that organisation is accompanied by experience.We call this the How/Why gap and argue that it cannot be closed at the level of mecha-nism: not theoretically, because no computational condition entails experience, and notempirically, because no recording method captures synaptic-scale events across a wholeliving brain. We instead advance a structural hypothesis about the physical precondi-tions under which subjective experience becomes functionally indispensable: individua-tion (the non-copyability of the system’s computational identity) and mortality (genuine,irreversible risk of permanent annihilation), jointly necessary. A 2×2 analysis illustratesthat the two conditions play distinct roles and that whenever either is absent, qualialose their functional role of signalling irreversible threat to an irreplaceable self. Thisdecomposes what the mortal-computation literature, Causal Liability Theory, Froese’s en-activism, and Seth’s biological naturalism each treat as a single property, and answerstwo questions Seth leaves open: which features of life matter for consciousness, andwhat a theory of substrate-dependent computation would look like. It yields architecturalconditions for artificial consciousness — hardware-bound computation, non-extractablestate, non-resettable learning, active self-maintenance, irreversible cessation — with afalsification condition and a prediction. Current AI, built on copyable parameters andrestorable state, fails both preconditions. A system satisfying them would be an artificialorganism, and building one carries the responsibility of creating something that can bepermanently lost.
No takes yet. Share an insight, caveat, or question.
Franny Philos Sophia (2026) studied this question.
Synapse has enriched 8 closely related papers on similar clinical questions. Consider them for comparative context: