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In this paper, I argue that Relational Values can support an argumentative defense of biodiversity in spite of their context-sensitivity and agent-relativity. Building on the work of several authors, I adopt a ‘deliberative buck-passing account of value’, according to which values do not themselves provide normative reasons for actions or attitudes. Rather, values refer to descriptive and evaluative properties of the object that provide such reasons. On this view, environmental Relational Values refer to extrinsic properties that can be critically examined for their normative force through general concepts and principles associated with human-nature relationships. Therefore, reasoning about Relational Values in collective deliberation and in personal reflection can provide a basis for justifying and criticizing the Relational Values held by oneself and others. Four examples of Relational Values associated with biodiversity are used to illustrate how such values can be shared, supported, contested, and rejected.
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Anna Deplazes‐Zemp (2026) studied this question.
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