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Cooperation is a continuous core challenge for EU sanctions policy, both externally and internally. Resisting fragmentation requires forging international coalitions to en-hance the impact of sanctions and to send strong signals, while also counteracting the fault lines built into the fabric of the Union’s Common Foreign and Security Policy. Focusing on Russia-related measures between 2022 and 2025, this article argues that the EU has, on balance, navigated these pressures successfully. Internationally, sanctions coordination has functioned as coordinated unilateralism within a “coalition of the will-ing”. Internally, an increasingly assertive Commission has driven centralisation, whereas unanimity-based decision-making, sunset clauses and rigid licensing remain structural weaknesses. Private actors, however, continue to bear a disproportionate share of the costs of legal inconsistency while benefiting only marginally from flexibility mechanisms. Correcting this imbalance is both a practical necessity and a precondition for the long-term effectiveness of EU sanctions policy. The article concludes with recommendations on codifying international cooperation, making Common Foreign and Security Policy decisions leaner, and introducing more flexible licensing mechanisms.
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Johannes Schäffer (2026) studied this question.
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