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The end of World War I and the dissolution of Austria-Hungary left huge extents of private property stranded in the newly formed successor states. The governments of Czechoslovakia, Romania, the South Slav state, and Poland were more than eager to capitalize on their status as allies of the victorious Entente and lay their hands on what had been owned by now-enemy aliens, be it landed estates, industrial factories, or commercial enterprises. Landed property was probably the most coveted, as the expropriation of “foreign”—as they were touted—landholders provided the means to satisfy the land hunger of the Croatian, Slovene, Slovak, Romanian, and Polish peasantry.The German imperial princely family Thurn und Taxis resided in Regensburg, and during the nineteenth century bought considerable forest holdings in Croatia, in the mountain range above Rijeka/Fiume and bordering on the fertile river valleys close to Zagreb. Those holdings were the largest in the Kingdom of Croatia and in Yugoslavia, administered according to the principles of modern, efficient forestry; bringing a constant flow of revenue to the treasury; and providing influence over society and politics. They were also—as was customary since the abolition of serfdom—a source of conflict with local rural communities and a desired target for the protagonists of social reform and revolution, just as they were in the crosshairs of rival business networks to appropriate cheaply.Thus the Thurn und Taxises—as German citizens—shared the predicament of their fellow Austrian, Hungarian, and even Croatian landholding aristocrats; and just like many of the latter, they did not relinquish the forests without a fight. Moreover, after two decades of legal and political maneuvering, during which the property was briefly even released from sequester in 1925, they succeeded in salvaging a sizeable part of their lands and earning relatively generous monetary compensation for the remainder. Klaus Buchenau’s book focuses on the means of this struggle, to understand how the princely family navigated this extremely complicated field in which law, politics, business, and diplomacy intersected while lawyers, politicians, businessmen, and professional forest engineers promoted their rival and mutually exclusive schemes for the future of the Thurn und Taxis estates.Buchenau’s primary interest is how informality—corruption, but also other means of influencing political decisions—is operationalized in a context that proved to be surprisingly fluid in terms of law and its interpretation. His argument is informed by historical corruption research, a field he delineates from contemporary corruption studies as an approach that is better aligned with the contextual nature of what societies understand—in the past and the present—as corruption. Nevertheless, he borrows the methodology of principal-agent theory from the sociology of corruption; combined with a historical, source-based reading of loyalty and labeling. By applying principal-agent theory, he foregrounds the perspective of Regensburg and focuses on the ways the prince—from a remote position not only geographically, but in terms of his legal status as a noncitizen—could mobilize agents and subsequently control them in their dealings. In this endeavor the book follows the story chronologically, with sequences provided by the most important milestones regarding the forest holdings: sequestration in 1919, desequestration and its rapid revision in 1925, partial return of the forests in 1928, expropriation of seventy-five percent in 1932, and final agreement with the government about the return of the larger part of the forests under German diplomatic pressure in 1939. However, those events are used only as a general frame—in the form of short chapters—of the deeper story: the maneuvers of the prince to achieve a positive political decision after the Yugoslav government decided not to distribute the forests among the inhabitants of the area.As it would be expected, money was flowing to middlemen and politicians; their wives, protégés, and girlfriends; and legal and forest experts, who either were suspected of having influence over someone, or whose opinion carried weight regarding the value of the land or the rationale of keeping it together. The sources are—not surprisingly—often vague and patchy, even though the Thurn und Taxis estates generated scandal recurringly, leading to a parliamentary investigation about their release from sequester and in 1935 to a public trial, one that was abruptly terminated without going after the prominent politicians involved.Despite the scarcity of sources, it is clear that up to the expropriation in 1932, the prince operated through a primary agent, who was supposed to recruit and pay everyone else. Initially it was the influential Belgrade lawyer Jakov Čelebonović, well-networked with the dominant Serbian Radical Party and the head of the Jewish community in the city. Later, especially after rumors spread about how Čelebonović paid for his new lavish Belgrade residence from the Thurn und Taxis money, the prince turned to new interlocutors, this time Croatian lawyers from Zagreb—whose modus operandi did not differ from that of Čelebonović. Only after expropriation, during the fight for the return of the estates via legal and diplomatic means in the 1930s, did experts—including figures like Karl Haushofer, the “father” of geopolitics—gain more significance.All this might sound familiar to scholars of economic history, especially how businesses transitioned from Austria-Hungary to the successor states. This broader story is certainly an aspect one might feel Buchenau has mostly neglected—or at least failed to connect his story to, despite the obvious relevance and possibilities for historical generalization. His contribution, however, is not only a detailed case study; it also disentangles the actors within the web of corruption, identifies typical roles, and highlights all the inherent paradoxes and dilemmas of such informal fields. How much could the principal—the prince—trust his primary agent? How can one check the veracity of information received and measure the efficiency of costs? These questions are of importance especially when agents are incentivized to always say success is imminent, that they are only one step (bribe) away, or that even the restoration of the sequester favors the prince—claiming that otherwise the estate would have fallen into the hands of Serbian business networks for free. How could the judiciary of a state rife with corruption prosecute corrupt politicians without exposing everyone? How does the very stereotype of a country that is inherently corrupt generate and legitimate corruption from the “civilized” foreigners? The reader will not only get a sense of corruption as it happens. Buchenau sums up his conclusions in this regard in a more abstract and generalized form, conceived as a “grammar of corruption”: a set of rules that govern the operation of such networks, not as norms or orders, but like grammatical rules that prescribe a limited set of possibilities for how to formulate a sentence of a text. While the story of the Thurn und Taxis estate is now closed—Socialist Yugoslavia, unlike its interwar predecessor, did not bother with legal niceties—Buchenau’s grammar is a handy tool for further research on informality and corruption.
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Gábor Egry (2026) studied this question.
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