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After 2021, life insurance penetration fell while non-life penetration remained stable. This paper asks whether the divergence was larger where the inflation surge was larger, and what role interest rates and banks played in it. Combining Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Global Insurance Statistics with Euromonitor International macroeconomic, banking and price data for 44 economies, we find that the life/non-life premium ratio fell markedly more where inflation rose more: a one-standard-deviation larger surge is associated with a ratio about 11% lower over 2021–2023, close to the average decline in the sample. The association comes from life insurance, holds across most specifications and measures of the surge, is not detected before the surge, and concerns economies moving from low to moderately high inflation rather than hyperinflation. Life premiums fell relative to gross domestic product (GDP) by about the additional rise in prices while life payouts did not rise, which points to the nominal rigidity of contracts in force rather than to a surrender wave. Non-life penetration did not respond, consistent with the annual repricing of non-life contracts, and we find no evidence that policy rate competition or weak banking systems drove the divergence, although it is partly shared with pre-surge bank capital.
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Aujapuclla et al. (2026) studied this question.
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