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European Union law now licenses the firms that hold and exchange crypto-assets and calls this investor protection. It does not require any scheme to compensate their clients. No other licensed retail financial market in European Union law has such a floor. This article asks why such an elaborate enforcement architecture returns so little to the people it names as its beneficiaries. That fraud victims struggle to obtain both recognition and restitution is well established. The argument here is narrower. Four features make the failure structural rather than contingent. Transfers cannot be reversed, because irreversibility is designed in. Offender anonymity is a property of the technology, not a shortfall in investigation. The Markets in Crypto-Assets Regulation has no equivalent to the Investor Compensation Schemes Directive. The collective redress presupposes a named trader who frequently does not exist. Recognition fails too: these victims meet none of the usual criteria for victimhood. Meanwhile, new reimbursement rights in Europe exclude the crypto payment rail by design. As protection improves for other fraud victims, crypto-fraud victims are becoming the residual class. The article proposes five adjustments and states plainly which of them are new and which adapt established instruments.
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Angelos Tsiftsis (2026) studied this question.
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