Answers are grounded in this paper and cite their sources.
A prediction-market price is usually read as an average of traders' beliefs, weighted by wealth or risk tolerance. A well-scored survey of the same traders should then do as well, and in recent comparisons it does. We show that a market collects something such a survey cannot, traders' confidence in their own forecasts. No payment based on the outcome of a binary event gives an expected-utility respondent a strict incentive to report her confidence. In a call market, an ambiguity-averse trader who chooses her demand price by price reveals both her forecast and its weight in the price. She reveals them exactly, for any second-order belief and any smooth-ambiguity preference with constant absolute attitudes, and the firm can undo strategic shading. The reason is that ambiguity aversion makes a trader's willingness to trade away from her forecast depend on how sure she is of it. Two further results follow. To a second-order approximation the price is a forecast combination weighted by self-assessed precision. With its weights fixed, it beats the survey mean exactly when those weights are closer to the optimal weights than equal weights are. It loses when the least accurate traders are the most overprecise, and without position limits it can overshoot the truth. With dispersed information it gains much only when traders draw on few independent sources. In simulations, outcome-scored track records reveal little about accuracy, so the schedules become the firm's main source. A firm should therefore collect the schedules, not only the price. Working paper, not peer reviewed. Includes the electronic companion (pages ec1-ec7). Code: https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.24369926
No takes yet. Share an insight, caveat, or question.
Gwang-Syung George Hwang (2026) studied this question.
Synapse has enriched 8 closely related papers on similar clinical questions. Consider them for comparative context: