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Artificial intelligence and robotics can raise output while concentrating its gains among those who own the new capital. This paper asks when that happens, how strongly, and which public choices change the outcome. It builds a transparent synthetic economy, Techoslavakia, with 30 million people in 2026, eight economic classes and eight age groups, and income and wealth Gini coefficients of exactly 0.500. The model links household spending with minimum needs, production with machines that can replace workers, new tasks that create work, a full government budget, a wealth ledger, and explicit measures of diversion, waste and market power. It reproduces the starting national accounts exactly and passes 1,454 automated consistency checks. Nine policy packages are compared over 25 years, and results are tested with Shapley decompositions, one-at-a-time sensitivity variants, 300 global sensitivity draws and a parent–child mobility microsimulation. Under an assumed path in which machines could replace 90 per cent of baseline job-equivalents by 2046, with existing institutions and no compensation, the income Gini rises to 0.581 and the wealth Gini to 0.847 by 2051, poverty doubles to 20.4 per cent and unemployment reaches 42.5 per cent. Losses arise through job displacement, weaker wages and the concentration of automation equity among top owners. Classes 1 to 7 lose 7 to 41 per cent of income against a no-automation path, while the top 1 per cent nearly doubles its income. Income and wealth inequality need not move together, and a lower Gini does not by itself prove higher welfare. A package that combines a public ownership fund, care and education services, taxation of rents and capital income, competition policy and competent administration cuts the income Gini to 0.421 and poverty to 1.1 per cent, and outperforms the no-policy path in all 300 sensitivity draws. The same package under capture loses about half its gains. A 10 per cent robot-use levy raises only about 4 billion crowns a year, while removing an existing robot tax preference raises 60 billion. Hospitality absorbs at most 0.61 million of 9.05 million displaced job-equivalents, so service work cannot by itself replace lost employment. The synthesis is that ownership, taxation of rents and institutional quality, more than the technology itself, decide who gains from automation. For countries such as Pakistan, this implies that reform of tax administration, competition and public asset ownership should begin well before automation arrives at scale. All results are conditional simulations, not forecasts.
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Muhmmad Muqeem Islam Muqeem (2026) studied this question.
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