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Large language models (LLMs) are now embedded in chatbots, coding assistants, search tools and agents, and this has exposed a new class of security problems in which attackers use ordinary text to override a developer’s instructions or to push a model past its safety training. This paper reviews the literature on these problems, focusing on prompt injection and jailbreak attacks. It organises attacks into a taxonomy (direct and indirect injection, manual, optimisation-based, LLM-driven, obfuscated, multi-turn, multimodal and training-time attacks), organises defenses into eight layers from alignment-time training to system-level controls, and summarises the benchmarks and metrics used to compare them. It then examines a theme that is discussed less often than attack and defense strength, namely the cost of defending: most published defenses are applied uniformly to every request, while research on LLM routing and adaptive moderation shows that matching effort to difficulty can save cost. The paper discusses risk-proportional defense as a design direction, and closes with open problems, including adaptive attackers, evaluation validity, over-refusal, multi-model deployments and agents. The review draws on more than one hundred papers and resources published between 2020 and 2026.
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Prabhakarn et al. (2026) studied this question.
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