Answers are grounded in this paper and cite their sources.
Securing sixth-generation (6G) vehicular and Internet-of-Things (IoT) edge links requires an intrusion detector and a post-quantum cryptographic (PQC) profile that together fit a strict latency budget, yet they are usually selected independently. We present a deployment-aware framework that selects them jointly: compact feature budgets and classical detectors are combined with measured ML-KEM, ML-DSA, and SLH-DSA costs, filtered by hard deadline and bandwidth constraints, and ranked by context-aware Pareto utility across five edge contexts. Three benchmarks (CICIoT2023, VeReMi NextGen, and CICIoV2024) are evaluated under a leak-free protocol with de-duplication, using sender-grouped splits for VeReMi NextGen. The central finding is that feasibility is governed by handshake size, link bandwidth, and key-management policy rather than by detector accuracy or PQC computation: lattice profiles need under 1 ms of CPU time, yet their multi-kilobyte handshakes decide which profile fits each deadline, and no PQC profile meets a 5-ms, 1-Mbps CAN gateway without key amortization. Ablations show that accuracy-first selection changes the detector in all 15 dataset–context pairs, that byte-blind accounting makes six selections miss their deadlines, and that no CAN-gateway configuration is admissible under cold-start accounting when quantum resistance is mandatory. Leak-free evaluation lowers the best VeReMi NextGen macro-F1 from 0.9798 to 0.7506.
No takes yet. Share an insight, caveat, or question.
Sakr et al. (2026) studied this question.
Synapse has enriched 10 related papers. Consider them for comparative context: