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This paper argues that Ruth Millikan’s official definitions in Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories admit persistence-based direct proper functions. These definitions do not require reproductions to involve numerically distinct persisting items, thus supporting a broader account than her surrounding prose suggests. I demonstrate how this interpretation extends through Millikan’s first-order machinery and into her definition of direct proper function. Accordingly, direct proper functions can be conferred on synapses via synapse selection and, more implausibly, on rocks via rockfalls. I examine three strategies for blocking this result: a reproduction requirement, a population requirement, and a service requirement. Given Millikan’s explanatory aims, I argue that she should reject these as general requirements, but accept them for theoretically important subclasses.
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Fabian Hundertmark (2026) studied this question.
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