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Pricing decisions in the fresh agricultural produce supply chain face multiple challenges, including product perishability, information asymmetry, and market demand uncertainty. The dual-channel sales model and blockchain technology offer new opportunities to enhance consumer trust and operational efficiency. This paper constructs a Stackelberg game model for a dual-channel fresh agricultural product supply chain comprising producers and retailers, in which producers determine wholesale prices, online direct-sales prices, and the level of preservation efforts, while retailers determine offline retail prices. A mean-variance utility function is used to characterize the degree of risk aversion among participants. Under two scenarios—with and without blockchain—the study derives equilibrium decisions for four risk-aversion combinations: both producers and retailers are risk-neutral; only producers are risk-averse; only retailers are risk-averse; and both are risk-averse. Theoretical derivations are validated through numerical simulations. The study found that risk aversion among fresh agricultural product producers has a significant suppressing effect on wholesale prices, online prices, and the level of freshness preservation efforts, and this effect holds true in both scenarios—with and without blockchain technology. The impact of retailers' risk aversion is moderated by the level of consumers' freshness preferences: when preferences are high, their risk aversion leads to increases in all decision variables; conversely, when preferences are low, it causes offline prices to decrease; The combined effects of risk aversion follow a consistent pattern: decision levels are lowest when only fresh agricultural product producers exhibit risk aversion, intermediate when both parties are risk-averse, and highest when only retailers are risk-averse; the introduction of blockchain technology can increase supply chain members' profits and channel demand, but the level of preservation effort consistently decreases as unit blockchain costs rise, while whether pricing decisions follow this cost increase depends on a specific threshold; There is a critical threshold for the variable cost per unit of blockchain; only when the cost is below this threshold can blockchain adopters achieve a Pareto improvement.
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Li et al. (2026) studied this question.
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