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Unilateral sustainability regulation from the Global North has become a central feature of contemporary trade governance. The European Union’s Deforestation Regulation (EUDR), which conditions market access on proof of deforestation-free production, exemplifies this shift. Yet, systematic accounts of how producer countries in the Global South interpret, contest, and reshape such external regulatory demands remain limited. This article develops a relational framework of strategic regulatory engagement to analyze how producer states respond to unilateral sustainability rules through the interaction of three arenas: interstate relations, state–society relations, and regulatory network relations. Drawing on documentary analysis and semi-structured interviews, we examine Brazil and Indonesia, two pivotal suppliers of forest-risk commodities targeted by the EUDR. We show that responses are neither simple compliance nor outright resistance. In both cases, strong interstate bargaining leverage, cohesive domestic coalitions, and dense governance infrastructures generate layered engagement combining diplomatic contestation, bilateral embeddedness, and selective institutional adaptation, configurations that differ in substance and outcome depending on governance density and bilateral leverage. The article contributes a relational framework for analyzing producer country agency in sustainability governance and demonstrates that regulatory authority in multipolar value chains is negotiated and contested rather than unilaterally imposed.
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Pupo et al. (2026) studied this question.
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