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This article is the first to discuss Johann Samuel Stryk’s 1692 essay on the “law of oblivion” in early modern jurisprudence. Taking Stryk’s treatise as a point of departure, it surveys the historiography of legal forgetting and addresses the recent reemergence of oblivion as a precedent for contemporary transitional-justice mechanisms and privacy rights. Oblivion was a standard feature of early modern jus post bellum , often accompanied by, yet distinct from, the related concepts of amnesty and pardon. Drawing upon uses of oblivion in seventeenth- and eighteenth-century peace treaties and settlements, I articulate an understanding of oblivion as legal tool designed to address the fundamental incapacities of law itself, indeed as a precondition for the reestablishment of peace and the fulfillment of any reparative measures that might follow.
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Linda Kinstler (2026) studied this question.
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