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The maturity of China’s electric vehicle (EV) power battery technology has garnered favor from overseas EV manufacturers, which introduces challenges in supplier selection for them in cross-border procurement of batteries. We consider two EV manufacturers with co-opetition, i.e. an upstream EV manufacturer with battery production capacity and a downstream EV manufacturer without such capacity, and study the supplier selection problem of the latter, who can purchase batteries cross-border from the upstream EV manufacturer (cooperative mode) or an external supplier (non-cooperative mode). We consider that the cross-border tariff cost per unit of power battery is lower than EV, and the key findings are as follows: To achieve the transfer of tariff costs, as the cross-border tariff cost borne by the downstream EV manufacturer increases, the upstream EV manufacturer may reduce the wholesale price for batteries and the selling price of EVs. Additionally, the cooperation between EV manufacturers helps maintain selling price stability amidst tariff fluctuations. Furthermore, the cooperation willingness of EV manufacturers strengthens (resp. weakens) with the increase of the cross-border tariff cost per unit of EV (resp. power battery). Interestingly, we find that under certain conditions, EV manufacturers can simultaneously achieve economic benefits and enhance consumer surplus through cooperation.
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Qi et al. (2026) studied this question.
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