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Contemporary Philosophy of Mind has established the Second-person perspective as the paradigmatic mode of interpersonal recognition, defined by real-time reciprocity, bodily simultaneity, and immediate co presence (Gomila, 2001; Scotto, 2002). This article argues that this framework becomes conceptually insufficient under the conditions of ubiquitous computing, where interpersonal bonds persist across time through persistent digital infrastructures (servers, archives, chat logs, and algorithmic mediation) without requiring bodily synchrony. Drawing on the paradigmatic cases of Mats Steen, a Norwegian with Duchenne muscular dystrophy whose friendships in World of Warcraft endured beyond gaming sessions, and the hikikomori, Japanese individuals who sustain mutual recognition through online communities while remaining physically isolated, we show that meaningful interpersonal recognition can subsist in the absence of bodily simultaneity. From this, we derive a tripartite disjunction: either the Second-person must be redefined, or a new perspective must be posited, or the Second-person is part of a broader category. We rule out the first alternative because redefining the Second-person would empty its criterion of reality, and the third because the infrastructure is not a mere adjunct but a constitutive third term that reorganizes reciprocity in kind. Only the second alternative remains. We therefore propose the Fourth-person perspective, a distinct analytical category whose criterion of reality is articulated at two irreducible levels: infrastructural persistence as ontological condition and diachronic intentionality, the interpretive labor through which participants convert past traces into present commitments, as constitutive condition. We distinguish this proposal from two precursors that collapse the fourth person into the perspectives it was meant to exceed: Swan's (2014) extended First person self-quantification and Scharmer and Pomeroy's (2024) collective "fourthperson knowing," both of which omit the dyadic and infrastructural specificity of the phenomenon. We further distinguish the Fourth-person from a mere "Second-person with delay," arguing that a posted letter differs structurally from a platform that archives, predicts, and conditions the grammar of response. We then address three objections (epistemic fragility, the reductionist objection, and algorithmic enclosure), acknowledging the latter as a genuine vulnerability rather than dismissing it. We conclude that the Fourth-person perspective is necessary, not merely useful: it names the regime in which the bond is sustained by the expectation of future availability rather than by the reciprocity of the present, and it explains why that regime can produce both the intimacy of a long-distance friendship and the closure of an echo chamber, since both are constituted by the same trust in what is repeated, familiar, and ubiquitous.
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Felipe Eleutério Pereira (2026) studied this question.
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